在 matters.news 上面开了个账号，可能会同步一些文章过去。这里是开篇介绍以及一些关于 blog 的吐槽。还不知能不能在那边写下去。
一直在考虑，要不要在 matters 开个账号，把自己 blog 上的一些文章同步过来。在 matters 关注了一段时间，这里确实集中了一部分很优秀的社科类写作者，希望能够继续关注下去。而且这年头坚持写中文 blog 的人确实不多了，也很希望能够有一个这方面的社群，能够进一步交流。
首先，作为原教旨 blog 拥护者，我一直认为 blog 作为一个开放系统，需要满足两个条件：
系统自带原生 RSS 订阅；
作者可以选择向所有人（无论是否 matters 用户）开发评论功能。
这两个条件，matters 一条也不符合。虽然有第三方工具实现 RSS，但毕竟不是 matters 自带的功能。而评论功能只有注册了一段时间的站内用户才可以用。所以我其实是不喜欢 Matters Medium 这类的网站形式的。当然关于这些指摘，有着各种解释：譬如这样更有利于付费订阅、避免垃圾评论和网络水军、以及未必只有开发系统才叫做 blog……但我还是认为这些都不是必须通过这种半封闭的架构，才能解决的。这些其实都是对互联网开放性的越来越深的伤害。——总之你们可以把这当作 blog 老用户的吐槽。
ps，在 matters 通过第三方生成 RSS 地址的攻略： https://rsshub.app/matters/author/fivestone 把链接最后面的 id 换成你想要关注的作者 id。
其次，经过互联网十几年的风风雨雨，我现在对任何 blog 平台，乃至任何网站，几年后会不会倒闭，完全没有信心。这不是在诅咒 matters 啦，只是想到自己投入心血维持的社交网络，几年后因爲各种莫名的理由消失，就没心思把它继续下去。区块链保存也好、众筹维护也罢，其实都只是噱头。即使不涉及政治审查，仅仅是由于资本运作而倒闭的网站，无论墙内墙外，数不胜数：微软space、Google Reader……如今靠谱的老牌 blog 平台，似乎只剩下 wordpress 和 blogspot，免费版的页面上被塞满了难看广告。似乎只有自建域名和服务器，才是长久保存的王道。但那些自建 wordpress 以及用 Github 静态空间的 blog，需要的技术门槛也确实很高，能做到这一点的人，写出来的 blog 内容，也基本是纯IT（笑）。在 blog 式微的时代，维持一个低门槛的长期写作环境，确实是很难的事情。
The real damage to anthropology, however, is the paradoxical retreat into conservatism, from which the discipline’s founders painstakingly broke: the deployment of one’s own beliefs and values as heuristics for the study of all human life. The consequences of this retreat are many and I shall mention here only two. The first is the persistence of functionalism, or the reduction of social analysis to a set of ready-made beliefs, whether beliefs in the primacy of the physical world (materiality) or in the individual’s inner, psychological life (affect) or in the universal pursuit of autonomy (resistance). The second is anthropology’s ambient pietism, or the displacement of analysis with assertions of one’s own moral or political stance. It is all very well to believe in gender equality or the evils of colonialism, but when our own normative position is deployed as fundamental social theory—such as feminist or postcolonial theory—it does little more than reassert the already-held beliefs. The evaluative judgment built into it blocks social explanation and generates results that are complacent, conventional, and closed to the discovery of new things. The confusion of advocacy for analysis has made contemporary anthropology allergic to any kind of genuine moral or political difference. If earlier generations saw the comprehension of fundamental moral difference—head hunting, cannibalism, tribal warfare, and the like—as their duty, the new clings increasingly to the familiar close to home. Theoretically, what has displaced different people’s cosmologies are “common sense notions—of polity, self, and essential, shared humanity—that metropolitan actors and institutions foist upon the world” (Scheele and Shryock in press). The result is the growing poverty of anthropological theory, and the retreat of the discipline from the frontline of social theory.
Piliavsky, Anastasia. 2017. “Disciplinary Memory against Ambient Pietism.” HAU-JOURNAL OF ETHNOGRAPHIC THEORY 7(3):13–17.
In saying that what anthropology must do is to interpret, Geertz was asserting that the kind of explanation it should seek to offer is qualitatively different from that pursued in the natural sciences, which had provided models and inspiration for other schools of sociological and philosophical thought, most proximately in anthropology at the time, in the diverging approaches of A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, Leslie White and Claude Lévi-Strauss. The distinction between interpretation and causal explanation has roots in German historical thought, in the idea that the possible forms of explanatory success are fundamentally different in the sciences respectively of nature and spirit (Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften). The foundational claim is that human beings are, in Charles Taylor’s resonant phrase, ‘self-interpreting animals’. On this view, the ideas and values people have inform their self-descriptions, and those self-descriptions stand not merely in an external causal relation to what they do, but are internally constitutive of who they are and what they are doing. If this is so, then explanation of human conduct in terms of causal laws, on the model of the natural sciences, must be a flawed ambition. It is not merely that such ambitions are impossible to achieve in practice; it is a mistake in principle even to aim at them. An entirely different set of criteria is required for success in an interpretive enterprise. This much was common currency in the linguistic turn, and Geertz expressed the general position forcefully. In addition, he argued that it is a fact about human evolution that we have developed in such a way that being shaped by culture is now part of human ‘nature’, so that without culture, humans would be radically incomplete and unviable. So, for Geertz, there was a firm scientific account of why human conduct, being inherently meaningful, could not be subject to scientific explanation.
Laidlaw, James. 2018. “Interpretive Cultural Anthropology: Geertz and His ‘Writing-Culture’Critics.” Pp. 148–158 in Schools and Styles of Anthropological Theory. Routledge.